As revealed in Key 06 , There is a category of Forms that Plato refers to as The Intermediary Forms, which evidently captures the Key Logic that conjoins that The Conceptual Realm with The Perceptual Realm.
Some Forms, according to Plato’s theory, unlike the Form Apple or the Form Green, cannot be verified perceptually anywhere in nature or the physical realm.
For example, The Form Justice or The Form Goodness are purely metaphysical forms that cannot be perceptually verified as The Form Apple would. In other words, one could confirm the presence of these Forms based on a Personal Conceptual Judgment verified through certain perceptual events or experiences, which apparently translate the context of Happiness. For example, the circumstances of a given Trip to Italy, with all that such a trip would entail on The Perceptual Level from experiences and encounters (i.e. plane travel, hotel experience, tourist site visits, restaurants and clubs etc..) could be compelling to a given person x to consider as verifiably expressive of what Happiness is.
However, person x, in this case, could only authenticate the perceptual possibility of happiness through a subjective yes that the mind expresses internally and which is empirically impossible to verify to another perceiver as would an apple be. This other given perceiver would have to be in person x’s shoes whilst he’s on his particular trip and would also have to share with him his exact idea of happiness to view things within a similar context, and yet still This Other could not possibly share an identical vision of happiness with person x.
Type of Forms as this, like The Form Happiness , tend to arouse justifiable doubt concerning the existence and absoluteness of metaphysical forms altogether, for these forms are usually considered highly relative and subjective to the perceiver. After all, beauty is said to be “in the Eye of the Beholder.” In other words, the possibility of each human on earth associating purely metaphysical Forms like The Form Happiness or The Form Beauty to the same exact perceptual experiences and circumstances is absurd. This raises a justifiable philosophical concern over the existence of an absolute Form Beauty that supposedly accounts for all perceptual manifestations of beauty in space and time. Its existence is highly questionable, based on the intangibility of such form.
The issue in simple words is whether one could ever possibly claim any absoluteness to forms that cannot be verified through the immediate vision. If not, wouldn’t this provoke a questionable concern over The Validity of The Realm of Forms altogether? Wouldn’t this also challenge the Platonic definition of Knowledge as being innate to the benefit of its polar opposite, The Empirical Logic?
The answer, according to Plato:
There are certain Forms that the perceiver cannot perceptually encounter anywhere in nature, and yet, he cannot possibly doubt or deny their validity.
Plato here particularly refers to Mathematical Forms (both Arithmetic and Geometric). He defines these Forms as Intermediary Forms that reside somewhat midway between the Seen and the Unseen – somewhere between the purely physical and the purely metaphysical.
Mathematical Forms (like circles and numbers), according to Plato, are intangible. There is no independent object out there in the physical real which could be identified as The Object Circle, neither is there a tree out there that bears a fruit called The Fruit One. However, according to Plato, the existence of such forms is patently obvious.
The Numeric One, for instance, although it cannot be immediately encountered on the perceptual level as an object in itself, constitutes the immediate perceptual experience of any physical object. No particular object in space and time could ever be highlighted into vision without appearing within a numeric context as The One Object X (i.e., The Apple X, The Mountain Y, The Event X1 etc.). Hence, The Numeric One evidently constitutes the perceptual possibility itself. In other words, any perceptual object could only be visually identified for what it is and for being where it is, once placed within a numeric context. This numeric context seems to account for both its Meaningful Presence, which distinguishes it from different objects next to it, and its Particularity of presence, which distinguishes it from identical objects next to it.
The question remains: how could the perceiver perceptually interact with The Numeric One without ever empirically encountering any identifiable perceptual object that could be referred to as An Object 1? How could The Numeric One be present in everything we encounter, yet still be impossible to see?
In conclusion, mathematical Forms, although of a conceptual nature, cannot be denied perceptually.
The mere possibility of the existence of Metaphysical Forms that the perceiver could not possibly encounter perceptually, yet would still possess such undeniable perceptual integrity, seems to indirectly justify The Possibility of other less verifiable metaphysical forms like The Form Happiness and The Form Beauty.Follow